RexCurry.net was one of a handful of lawyers who protested against
and tried to stop assembly-line searches and demands for identification
and 'papers' at government buildings and elsewhere. Many courthouses
force lawyers to submit to the degrading practices (along with everyone
else) and most lawyers submitted without a peep of protest, and many lawyers
openly defended the police-state tactics and they still do so to this very
TEACH EVERYONE TO SAY NO TO SEARCHES
- Rex teaches school with new lessons about liberty.
THE SNTS SUPERHERO
- you can be the "Say
NO to Searches" superhero, with this free gear.
4th Am. UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
schools enable illegal searches of students.
4th Am. SEARCHES WITH DOGS
- drug laws
encourage the corrupt use of drug dogs in a police state.
- these motions stop
dogs used as ruses to violate the constitutional rights of humans.
SAY "NO" TO SEARCHES (SNTS)
- liberty lawyers
fight government out of control.
LAS VEGAS REVIEW JOURNAL - supports guns in courthouses & ending
ASSEMBLY LINE SEARCHES
can police state tactics be refused?
-wants you to bend over
for his cold paranoid finger pic(1) pic(2)
. Tell him
to bite the 4th Am.
LAWYER SEEKS INFO ON SEARCH
- describe any incidents and their outcome.
OPPOSING DEMANDS FOR IDENTIFICATION
- & police states and government paranoia.
- hand out these stickers
at parades & events. It's my educational pro bono work.
DRUG SNIFFING DOGS
- he said "NO" to
searches (SNTS). And he won! Bow-wow !
DRUGS, GUNS & BAD POLICE SEARCHES
- another victory for liberty & peacful conduct.
PEACEFUL COCAINE SALE
WITH BAD PURSE SEARCH
- lady is free to go.
COPS: THEIR OWN ANONYMOUS TIP
- not in this cocaine case.
Consent, cars, and drugs
Here are cases that illustrate issues in consent searches of vehicle stopped
as a result of traffic stops. Because consent searches of vehicles are so
popular with police officers these days, these cases are important to understand.
In Johnson v. S., ___ So. 2d ___, 33 F.L.W. D2515 (1st DCA 10/24/2008), an
officer made a valid stop for a tag light violation. He asked the driver
and the appellant, a passenger, for consent to search their persons, and
both agreed. Before searching defendant, the defendant tried to get out of
the car, and the officer directed him to remain inside. A subsequent search
of the defendant revealed cocaine. The trial court denied a motion to suppress,
and the First DCA reversed, finding that the officer's actions constituted
an illegal seizure of the defendant.
"Importantly, consent is fleeting. The only relevant time period to determine
if an individual has given voluntary consent is at the time of the search.
Once consent is given, it can be withdrawn at any time for any reason. It
can be withdrawn by an individual's words (see Jackson v. State, 730 So.
2d 364, 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (stating "the individual may, at any time
during the search, withdraw consent by words"), or by an individual's actions.
See Lowery v. State, 894 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (finding consent
was withdrawn when the defendant attempted to reach into his pockets at the
same time as the officer); Pierre v. State, 732 So. 2d 376, 378 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1999) (finding consent was withdrawn when the defendant ran away from
the officer). Likewise, it seems reasonable that consent can be rendered
invalid, effectively withdrawn, by intervening unlawful police conduct. This
would be especially true when the unlawful conduct involves a violation of
the Fourth Amendment rights of an individual whose previously granted consent
is all law enforcement has to justify a search. In such circumstances, it
would be unreasonable to assume consent continues indefinitely, no matter
what action law enforcement takes. Applying this principle here, the illegal
detention of Appellant, after he had given consent but before the police
exercised the privilege extended by the consent, created a taint which could
be overcome only by a sufficient break in the chain of illegality. The burden
to establish this break rests with law enforcement. There is no evidence
that such a break occurred. Therefore, the search must be found nonconsensual,
and the evidence improperly seized. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's
motion to suppress."
In S. v. Petion, ___ So. 2d ___, 33 F.L.W. D2505 (2d DCA 10/24/2008), an
officer made a late-night stop of a car on the interstate for a window tint
violation. The officer gave a warning, and then asked for and got consent
to search. He quickly found a locked after-market compartment in the rear
passenger area and asked whether defendant knew how to open it. He did not,
and the officers then spent an hour opening the compartment, inside which
they found cocaine. The trial court granted a motion to suppress, ruling
that the destructive nature of the search went beyond defendant's consent,
and that his non-verbal actions constituted a withdrawal of his consent.
"Under the United States Supreme Court's holding in Jimeno, the deputies
did not need to obtain additional or separate permission to continue the
search into the locked, secret compartment. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 ("[I]t
was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent
to search respondent's car [for drugs] included consent to search containers
within that car which might bear drugs."). Thus, from the viewpoint of the
circuit court, the primary issue in this case was whether Mr. Petion withdrew
his consent to search the secret compartment after it was discovered. As
explained above, the circuit court determined that Mr. Petion revoked his
consent when he refused to assist the deputies in gaining access to the compartment.
The problem with this finding is that Mr. Petion did not testify at the suppression
hearing, and the testimony from the two deputies established that Mr. Petion
claimed that he did not own the car and knew nothing about the secret compartment
or how to open it. He never asked them to stop the search, he shrugged when
given the opportunity to object to the deputy's forcing open the compartment,
and sat passively on the side of the road for the one-hour period while the
deputies were trying to break into the compartment.
"It is well settled that in the context of a consensual encounter, a voluntary
consent to search can be withdrawn. .... It is equally well settled that
the consent can be withdrawn either verbally or nonverbally. See E.B., 866
So. 2d at 203. It is not so well settled what type of nonverbal conduct revokes
consent to search or who bears the burden of proof to establish that consent
once given has been revoked.
"The Fifth Circuit approaches consent searches with a rather useful analytical
structure. See United States v. Freeman, 482 F.3d 829 (5th Cir. 2007). In
Freeman, the court divides this issue into four subissues: (1) Did the defendant
consent? (2) Was the consent voluntary? (3) Was the search within the scope
of the consent? and (4) Did the defendant have the authority to give the
"Thus, we conclude that if a defendant raises the issue of withdrawal of
consent by nonverbal communication, the State must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant did not engage in the type of nonverbal
communication that an objectively reasonable officer would interpret as a
withdrawal of consent. In this case, Mr. Petion's conduct can be fairly summarized
as a passive failure to object. Reviewing this issue de novo and relying
on the circuit court's historical findings, we conclude that he did not revoke
or withdraw his consent by any nonverbal communication after the deputies
found the secret compartment."